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Abstract 
The 1st July 2015 was the hottest July day on record (37.5⁰C recorded at Heathrow) in the UK, and record-
breaking temperatures were recorded across England. This short-duration heatwave (30/06-01/07/2015) 
affected railway services both directly, by causing asset failure or malfunction; or indirectly, by 
necessitating the use of emergency speed restrictions (ESRs) to reduce the likelihood of track-buckling. 
Incidents caused by heat and lightning were recorded across the British railway network and knock-on 
delays affected rail travel in regions where extreme weather did not have a direct impact. In total, 23,700 
delay minutes were attributed to ESRs; 12,800 to heat; and, 4,000 to lightning incidents. Attributing specific 
incidents to extreme weather is problematic, and it is likely that the actual number of incidents caused by 
the extreme weather on 30/06-01/07 was far greater. Indeed, there were nearly 220,000 delay minutes on 
30/06-01/07; all regions experienced more than twice the daily average delay minutes on one or both days, 
costing an estimated £16 million to the national economy.  Incidents on critical routes (e.g. London North 
Eastern connecting London and Scotland) or near critical transport nodes such as Manchester Piccadilly 
caused the longest delays. Under future warmer climatic conditions, heatwaves and extreme temperatures 
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are projected to occur more frequently and the railway operator has several measures to adapt or update 
existing infrastructure in order to reduce the impact of heat and lightning.  Alternative solutions such as 
low-cost sensors for real-time condition-monitoring or green infrastructure for increased asset resilience 
should also be considered.  
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1.1 Introduction 
Extreme weather, such as prolonged rainfall, intense rainfall, heatwaves, strong winds, and storm surges 
can cause numerous problems for railway infrastructure, resulting in delays and disruption for passengers 
and freight customers. In recent years, there have been several high-profile extreme weather events. For 
example, in February 2014, an 80 metre section of track that formed part of the London to Penzance 
railway line, including the platforms at Dawlish station, was severely damaged by high seas, heavy rain, and 
strong winds (Network Rail, 2015a). This damage left the southwest peninsula of the UK without a critical 
rail route for 2 months which severely impacted the local economy and society, and incurred costly repairs 
for Network Rail (Dawson et al., 2016). In June 2012, intense summer storms caused flooding and landslips 
that closed sections of both the East Coast and the West Coast Mainlines which connect London to 
Scotland, as well as regional services across the UK. Initially the impacts of track closures were localised but 
these quickly became national as the knock-on effect of local delays and the severing of both mainlines 
between London-Scotland affected rail travel across the country. In total, the June 2012 storms incurred 
over 10,000 weather-related delay minutes with the impacts lasting until mid-July (Jaroszweski et al., 2015). 
In December 2015, a succession of winter storms took their toll on the rail network: trees felled by Storm 
Barney damaged overhead cables in northwest England; heavy rainfall associated with Storm Desmond left 
the West Coast Mainline track under 2 metres of floodwater at Carlisle disrupting travel between London 
and Scotland for several days; heavy rainfall from Storm Eva caused several landslips and line closures 
between Carlisle and Newcastle as well as severe flooding at Kirkstall, West Yorkshire; and finally, flooding 
from Storm Frank damaged the Lamington Viaduct in Scotland which led to disruption and closures on the 
West Coast Mainline between Carlisle and Glasgow (Network Rail, 2015b; 2016a).  Network Rail estimates 
that weather costs the infrastructure owner and operator between £100-200 million each year although 
this is likely to be an underestimate because attributing individual equipment failure to extreme weather is 
not always possible, and these figures do not include the operational costs of actually managing a weather 
event (Network Rail, 2015c).  Costs also do not include the wider social or economic impacts of the 
disruption of rail transport. For example, Network Rail estimated the cost of repairing the track at Dawlish 
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at £35 million (HoCTC, 2015); but the wider economic impact of the rail disruption on tourism, fishing, and 
other industries in Devon has been estimated between £60 million and £1.2 billion, with individual business 
losing between £100 to £1,000 per day of line closure (DMF, 2015).     
Following the recent succession of relatively cool summers in the UK, the impact of heatwaves and extreme 
heat on the railway infrastructure has become relatively minimal in comparison to other extreme weather 
events such as prolonged rainfall, intense rainfall, strong winds, and storm surges. It has therefore received 
little attention in press reports or in industry climate change adaptation reports (e.g. Network Rail, 2015d). 
However, previous warm summers such as 1995 and 2003 clearly show that heat severely impacts railway 
infrastructure (Thornes, 1997; Hunt et al., 2006). Heat impacts upon railway assets in a variety of ways 
(Palin et al., 2013; Ferranti et al., 2016). For example, the heating of rail track in direct sunshine can lead to 
thermal expansion and consequential buckling of the rail. Track buckling is more likely to occur in 
combination with the additional energy of a passing train, and for this reason emergency speed restrictions 
are used in hot weather conditions to slow down trains and thus reduce the risk of buckling and potential 
derailment. The reported incidence of rail buckles is higher during warmer summers such as 1995 and 2003 
(Hunt et al., 2006) and the use of temporal analogues shows that the number of buckles and the associated 
financial costs are predicted to increase in the future under warmer climatic conditions (Dobney et al., 
2009; Dobney et al., 2010).  Extreme heat can also cause overhead lines that transmit electricity to the 
trains to expand and sag causing de-wirement of the pantograph. The pantograph connects the train to the 
overhead line and therefore the electricity supply needed to power the train; de-wirement leaves the train 
without power. The incidence of overhead line sag was also projected to increase in a future warmer 
climate (Palin et al., 2013); following this study Network Rail introduced new policy requiring the use of 
auto-tensioned fixings for the overhead lines, this should significantly reduce the occurrence of line sag in 
the future. Signalling assets can also malfunction on warmer days and indeed signalling failures account for 
57% of reported heat-related incidents between 2006 and 2013 (Ferranti et al., 2016). Telecommunications 
assets, particularly those within lineside cabinets or location cases are also sensitive to heat; the 
temperature within a location case can be much warmer than ambient temperature, and can also change 
much more rapidly (Rail Corp, 2012), leading to the equipment overheating. Higher temperatures may also: 
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reduce the opportunity for track maintenance which cannot be done on days when ambient temperatures 
are above 21°C, or predicted to exceed 25° in the subsequent three days; increase the risk of lineside fires; 
and, increase the risk of rail employees suffering from heat stress during routine outdoor work (Palin et al., 
2013). Finally, higher temperatures can also cause passenger discomfort, for example in overcrowded or 
poorly ventilated trains, or in glazed buildings and shelters; and may also lead to increased alcohol use by 
passengers leading to more aggressive behaviour, slips, trips and falls (RSSB, 2015a).  
Extreme heat therefore impacts railway services either directly, by causing asset failure or malfunction; or 
indirectly, by necessitating the use of emergency speed restrictions (ESRs) to reduce the likelihood of track-
buckling. Both cause delay and disruption for passengers and freight customers, and incur financial costs 
for Network Rail who are required to make payments via the Schedule 8 system to compensate the train 
and freight operating companies for poor performance (ORR, 2015). There is also an additional financial 
cost associated with repairing the broken or faulty asset, and with managing the incidents and 
consequential delays. As the Dawlish example clearly shows, delays also have a wider impact on regional 
and national economy and society. Despite this, there is little empirical research into the observed impact 
of extreme heat on the railway infrastructure (Koetse and Rietveld, 2009). Accordingly, this study provides 
a detailed assessment of the impact that a short-duration heatwave had on the UK’s railway network. It 
examines the fault incidents recorded by Network Rail on 30th June to 1st July 2015; the latter was the 
hottest day recorded in UK history.  
 
 
1.2 Synoptic Situation 
The 1st July 2015 was the hottest July day on record in the UK (Kendon et al., 2016).  A maximum 
temperature of 36.7 °C was recorded at Heathrow at 14:13 UTC (Weather, 2015a), and record-breaking 
temperatures were recorded at several other weather stations across the UK (Figure 1 and Table 1; BADC, 
2016). The previous maximum temperature for July was 36.5 °C at Wisley, Surrey on 19th July 2006, which 
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was the highest recorded UK temperature since the record-breaking heatwave in August 2006 (Kendon et 
al., 2016). From late June until September 2015, much of mainland Europe experienced heatwave 
conditions (Mekonnen et al., 2016). The heat experienced on 30th June and 1st July in the UK was associated 
with hot air that was advected northwards from Spain (Kendon et al., 2016). The heat began building during 
the last week of June and peaked in the early afternoon on the 1st July, before cooler air and a thundery 
trough advanced from the west during the middle to late afternoon (Weather, 2015b; 2015c). This created 
thundershowers with lightning and hail in most of Great Britain (except for the south-east), particularly in 
the northeast (Weather 2015c).  
This short-duration heatwave was different from the recent heatwaves in 2003 and 2006 for two reasons. 
Firstly, it remained warm overnight on the 30th June leading to high temperatures early in the day on the 1st 
July (Kendon et al., 2016). For example, the overnight minimum temperature at Heathrow (21:00-09:00 
UTC) was 20.7 °C; the maximum temperature was 32.5 °C (BADC, 2016). Secondly, unlike the heatwaves 
experienced in 2006 and 2003, record-breaking temperatures were observed across the length and breadth 
of England. For example, the temperature recorded at Stonyhurst in Lancashire broke the previous 
maximum temperature record from 1976 by 1.1°C (Weather, 2015a).  Figure 1 shows the maximum 
temperature recorded on 30th June and 1st July 2015 at weather stations which are part of the Met Office 
Integrated Data Archive System (MIDAS) Land and Marine Surface Stations Dataset (1853-current) (BADC, 
2016). It highlights those weather stations where long-term (> 50 years) temperature records were broken 
on 1st July 2015 (Kendon et al., 2016).  
 
 
2 Data 
Network Rail is responsible for the performance and management of the majority of Great Britain’s railway 
infrastructure, upon which different passenger and freight operating companies run their trains. The 
infrastructure includes over 20,000 miles of track, and thousands of signalling and telecommunications 
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assets. For management purposes the railway network is separated into several Routes as shown on Figure 
2. 
Information on asset performance is collected by Network Rail using a variety of systems and procedures 
and stored in several different databases. Information from two separate databases; FMS (Fault 
Management System), and TRUST (Train Running System on TOPS (Total Operation Processing System)), are 
used in this study. FMS and TRUST were developed separately, and were designed for different purposes, 
and therefore there are differences in the type of information recorded in each databases. As faults and/or 
delays are independently recorded in either FMS or TRUST, some incidents can appear only in FMS; some 
incidents can appear only in TRUST; and, some incidents do appear in both datasets. FMS records fault 
history details at national level, and integrates and connects several legacy Network Rail databases 
developed for different asset types (Network Rail, 2008). FMS contains information on asset type, location, 
and includes a free text description of the fault written by the person who dealt with the specific incident, 
that may attribute the fault to specific weather phenomena. TRUST is also a legacy system designed to 
monitor the progress of trains and tracking delays. The system compares the times at which trains arrive, 
depart or pass specific locations and compares them with the schedule in order to retrospectively calculate 
any delay minutes, and associated delay costs (Network Rail, 2016b). TRUST is an operational database that 
can be freely downloaded (http://www.networkrail.co.uk/data-feeds/). In general, unlike FMS, TRUST data 
does not include detailed information on the failed or faulty asset, nor does it contain specific information 
about the fault or failure such as the free text description in FMS. In contrast, unlike TRUST, FMS does not 
contain information on delay costs or minutes. Those incidents which do appear in both datasets can be 
retrospectively cross-related for analysis purposes. 
Although neither TRUST nor FMS were designed for meteorological analysis, or for use in weather impact 
studies, both databases contain data that can, with careful processing, be applied for these purposes. For 
this study, weather-related incidents were identified from the free text column in FMS using an adapted 
algorithm developed for a previous study (Ferranti et al., 2016). The algorithm was used to search for 
weather-related key words and phrases recorded in the database such as: buckle, temp, expansion, hot, 
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thermal, weather, storm, high, light, etc. Those incidents selected by the algorithm were carefully examined 
by eye to remove erroneous or ambiguous data. Particular care was taken to differentiate between those 
incidents which were caused by heat, and preventative speed restrictions that are used to minimise the 
impact of track-buckling under hot weather conditions. Weather-related incidents from TRUST were 
provided by Network Rail following their own propriety analysis to investigate the impact of weather on the 
railway infrastructure (Network Rail, 2015c. Finally, FMS and TRUST datasets were cross-related using ID 
numbers, and also spatially joined using GIS in order to identify common incidents and prevent duplication.  
A comparison period is useful to contextualise the impact of the extreme weather on 30/06-01/07. For 
example, the number of incidents from the heatwave event could be compared with TRUST and FMS data 
for the same time period for the previous year, or previous years (2006-2013). However, Ferranti et al. 
(2016) demonstrated that the resilience of railway infrastructure to heat increases through the summer 
season with each incremental hot day as heat-vulnerable equipment is repaired or replaced. Thus 
comparing 30/06-01/07 with incident rates from previous years is counter-intuitive because the heat-
resilience of the infrastructure will vary depending upon each years’ antecedent weather conditions and 
the general condition of the infrastructure at that particular time. The heatwave event could also be 
compared with a mean daily incident rate from 2016; again this does not take into account the increased 
heat-related failure rates in the early summer season (see further, Ferranti et al., 2016) and would also 
include a typically higher daily incident rates due to other weather phenomena in winter. After 
consideration, a 5 week period from 15th June to 19th July 2015 was selected (excluding the heatwave 
event). This period reflects normal operations during June and July 2015 in the two weeks before and after 
the week containing the short-duration heatwave event.  The UK was not subjected to any other heatwaves 
during this 5 week period; indeed the months of June and July were slightly cooler than the 1981-2010 
average (Kendon et al., 2016). This 5 week period is not a ‘baseline’ or a ‘control period’ per se, simply a 
comparison period to contextualise the impact of the extreme weather on 30/06-01/07. FMS data from 
15th June to 19th July 2015 is incomplete or missing for 4 routes: Anglia, Wales, Western Thames Valley, 
and Western West (Figure 2). 
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3. Results  
3.1 Impact of extreme weather on railway infrastructure 
Figure 3 shows the total number of incidents recorded in the Network Rail FMS and TRUST databases 
between 15th June and 19th July 2016. Both datasets show a weekly pattern with a reduced number of 
incidents recorded at the weekend, and a clear increase in the number of incidents on during the heatwave 
event. For FMS this represents a 66% and 54% increase compared to the daily average weekday mean 
during the comparison period. In TRUST, more than 84,500 and 105,500 delay minutes were recorded on 
30th June and 1st July respectively, which represents increases of 84% and 130% increase compared to the 
daily average weekday mean. It is important to note that the difference between the percentage increases 
relate to the differences in the types of data recorded by the two datasets and should not be directly 
compared. Both FMS and TRUST datasets clearly show that this was not a typical day on the railway 
network and that heat and the other extreme weather on 30/06-01/07 severely impacted the railway 
infrastructure. Indeed, this was the worst summer day in terms of performance since 2008, and affected a 
greater number of train operating companies than previous episodes of extreme heat (Network Rail 
2015e).  
Figure 4 shows the location of incidents attributed to extreme weather from both FMS and TRUST. 
Incidents which are common to both datasets are shown only once and are denoted by the key. On the 30th 
June there were 79 incidents attributed to extreme weather, predominantly heat. These were mainly 
located in England in Routes (Figure 2): London North Eastern (39%); London North Western - South (13%); 
London North Western - North (11%); and Wales (11%). Scotland was least impacted by the extreme 
weather. On 1st July, 67 incidents attributed to extreme weather were reported in central and eastern 
England, and in Scotland too: London North Eastern (43%); London North Western - North, London North 
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Western - South, Scotland, and Kent (9% each). There was also more lightning fault incidents than on the 
previous day (22%), especially in northeast England.  
Figure 5 shows the preventative ESRs introduced to reduce the risk of track-buckling and potential 
derailment; 67 were issued on 30th June and 50 on 1st July. Although the 1st July was a warmer day, 
curiously more ESRs were actually listed in FMS and TRUST on the 30th June than on 1st July. Whether there 
were fewer ESRs declared on the 1st July or whether this is an artefact of Network Rail reporting or 
recording procedures is unclear. 
 
3.2 Impact on the extreme weather by asset type (FMS) 
As explained in Section 2, attributing incidents to extreme weather is only possible when weather-related 
descriptions are provided in the incident record. However, as there is no other obvious reason for the high 
number of incidents observed on 30/06-01/07 it can be assumed that the majority of extra incidents shown 
in Figure 3.1a are due to the extreme weather. Figure 6a and 6b shows the breakdown of all FMS incidents 
by asset type on the 30/06-01/07 as compared to the period between 15th June and 19th July (Figure 6c). On 
both days, and over the longer averaging period, the greatest number of incidents is associated with track 
and signalling assets. Indeed the distribution of incidents across the different asset classes is broadly similar 
for 30/06-01/07 and 15/06-19/07 suggesting that all asset types were impacted by the weather, and that 
the extreme weather did not disproportionately impact any particular asset type.  
Table 2 compares the average number of FMS incidents per day (calculated from the 15/06-19/07 period 
excluding the heatwave event) with the number of incidents on 30/01 and 01/07 for sub-assets classes. 
This further shows that the extreme weather impacted a broad spectrum of asset types, although four 
asset sub-classes in particular (Table 2a): Operational Property (building), Traction Power (electrification & 
plant); Lineside Equipment (signalling/electrification & plant/telecoms) and Track Circuit (signalling); appear 
to have been more severely impacted by heat. Correspondence with Network Rail has indicated that 
Automatic Warning Systems are considered particularly sensitive to heat; although there were slightly 
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more incidents associated with Automatic Warning Systems on 30/6-01/07 they do not appear to have 
been disproportionality impacted when compared to other asset sub-classes (Table 2b).  
Finally, Figure 7 shows the impact that heat and lightning had on the different asset types by region for the 
30/06-01/07 period. Approximately 50% of reported heat and lightning incidents occurred in the London 
North Eastern route (see further Figure 4), where the extreme weather impacted all asset types. Signalling 
and telecoms assets appear particularly sensitive to lightning (Figure 7b); all asset types are vulnerable to 
extreme heat and the greatest number of incidents are recorded on signalling assets. This is consistent with 
previous heat impact studies (Ferranti et al., 2016).  
 
3.3 Impact of extreme weather on delay minutes and costs (TRUST) 
The TRUST system compares train running with the scheduled timetable and incidents from this database 
can be examined in terms of delay minutes and delay costs. Costs are taken from Schedule 8, the process 
by which Network Rail compensates train operators for unplanned service disruption that is caused by 
Network Rail and other train operators. Figure 8 shows the total delay minutes for each Route for all 
incidents recorded in TRUST starting on the 30th June and 1st July. Over the two-day period the greatest 
number of delay minutes were recorded on the London North Western Route (60,310 minutes) followed by 
the Southeast (Sussex and Kent; 43,763 minutes), and London North Eastern (37,731 minutes) (Table 3). In 
terms of the magnitude increase, the Western Route experienced the greatest increase in daily average 
delay minutes on 30th June, and the London North Western Route on 1st July (Table 3). With the exception 
of Scotland, every Route experienced more than twice the daily average delay minutes on one or both days 
of the heatwave event showing the extreme weather impacted across the whole of the railway network in 
England and Wales.  
Figure 8 also shows the delay minutes associated with weather-related incidents from TRUST comprising 
heat incidents, lightning incidents (1st July only), and ESRs. It should be noted that although ESRs are 
commonly blanket speed restrictions and therefore affect a whole line or even a broader area, for 
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attribution purposes they are located on a particular track section on the affected routes. For heat or 
lightning incidents the point locations represents the point or track section where the incident occurred.  
The number of delay minutes due to ESRs was greater on the 30th June, and were distributed across 
incidents of varying size in central, southern and eastern England. ESRs that accrued a large number of 
delay minutes included track sections in: Reading (3,200 min); London Paddington to Ladbroke Grove 
(2,200 min); Stoats Nest Junction to Earlswood, on the Brighton mainline between London and Brighton 
(2,000 min); and Salford Crescent to Bolton, a major route in Greater Manchester (1,500 min). There were 
fewer delays due to ESRs on the 1st July, even though in terms of maximum temperatures this was the 
hotter day. Large delays were experienced again at Reading (1,500 min) and Three Bridges (4,000 min) 
which is a major junction on the Brighton mainline. Although the recorded delay minutes was notably less 
on the 1st July, the cost of the ESRs were approximately the same on both days (Table 4). 
The mostly impactful incident in terms of delay minutes (6,900 min) and costs (£302, 000) was a heat-
related track fault that occurred between Stowmarket and Ipswich in Anglia on 30th June; this was ongoing 
until 5th July 2015. On the hotter 1st July, heat was less of a problem, however lightning caused several 
incidents in north-eastern England that led to considerable delays, for example at Northallerton (1,200 min; 
£45,800) and between Alnmouth and Morpeth (1, 800 min; £224,200) on the East Coast Mainline that 
connects London and Scotland.  
The magnitude of delay minutes attributed to a particular incident depends up the duration of the incident, 
and also the usage of the track section along which the delay occurred. For example, although Network Rail 
can potentially repair an electrical failure near Waterloo in six minutes, this can still result in a total delay of 
three hours (Network Rail, 2013). Incidents that occur along less frequently used sections of the railway 
network generally impact fewer trains and therefore accrue less delay minutes. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 8. The majority of ESRs had a duration of one day, but some (e.g. those at Reading) accrued a far 
greater number of delay minutes for they occurred along more critical sections of track, and therefore 
impacted a far greater number of trains. Similarly the lightning incident at Northallerton on 1st July is 
recorded as lasting only 4 minutes in the TRUST database (14:57-15:01), however because it occurred on 
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the LNE mainline, which is a critical transport route, it impacted upon a total 89 trains travelling between 
stations including: Kings Cross, London; Glasgow; Manchester; Liverpool and Newcastle (Figure 9a). The 
first recorded delay attributed to the lightning strike at Northallerton began at 14:08 and the last was at 
21:55. 
 
 
3.4 Limitations of the study 
It is important to note that the actual impact of the extreme weather on 30/06-01/07 is probably far 
greater than described here. It has already been acknowledged that the than those presented in Sections 
3.1 to 3.3 because the extreme weather may not have been noted as a causative factor, not least because 
weather may not have been the obvious cause of the incident (Network Rail, 2015c; Ferranti et al., 2016). 
For example, Figure 3 shows more than 500 extra incidents were recorded in the FMS database on 30/01-
01/07 (as compared to the weekday average), however only a quarter of these extras incidents (124 
incidents) can be directly attributed to heat, lightning or heat-related ESRs (Figures 4 and 5).  
Secondly, the financial impact goes far beyond those Schedule 8 costs derived from the TRUST database. 
Schedule 8 costs do not include the actual cost of repairing or replacing the faulty asset, or the additional 
costs that Network Rail or the train operating company may accrue in order to manage the incident 
(Network Rail 2015c).  Moreover, they do not account for any socio-economic impacts that a train delay 
may have on passengers or business; the National Audit Office estimates that every train delay minute 
costs the national economy £73.47 (2007 costs) (NAO, 2008). There were nearly 220,000 delay minutes on 
30/06-01/07 which equates to an estimated cost of £16 million to the national economy.  
Another major limitation is the absence of robust data to examine the impact that extreme weather, 
particularly extreme heat may have on passengers and staff. Extreme heat can cause passenger discomfort 
or illness in overcrowded or poorly ventilated trains, or in glazed buildings and shelters, and can sometimes 
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be associated with an increased alcohol use by passengers causing more minor accidents (RSSB, 2015a).  
This is problematic when the trains are running to schedule, but delays (either due to the extreme weather, 
or unrelated incidents) can further exacerbate the impact of extreme heat. For example, on 1st July there 
was a problem with a pantograph and the overhead lines on a track section of near Manchester Piccadilly 
Station. Manchester Piccadilly is a critical transport node that connects: national services between London 
and Scotland; regional services travelling east-west; and, local transport across the city of Manchester. 
Delays following this incident consequently propagated across much of the railway network, impacting 611 
trains from 15:31 on 1st July until 15:11 on the 2nd July; in total 19,000 delay minutes are attributed to this 
single incident (Figure 9b). This incident was not attributed to extreme weather but media reports indicate 
that extreme heat exacerbated the frustration and discomfort experienced by passengers. For example, 
Manchester Evening News described the inside of carriages ‘stifling’ with passengers on the train ‘close to 
fainting’ after a power loss left the train unable to move and the air-conditioning unable to operate (MEN, 
2015). Indeed, the risk to passengers from high temperatures on public transport is listed as a research 
priority in the 2017 Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA, 2016).  
Finally, this analysis has not linked specific asset incidents or failure to meteorological data, for instance to 
try to identify a threshold failure for specific asset types (e.g. Network Rail, 2014; Network Rail 2015c).  
Although, high-resolution meteorological data is available for the UK (e.g. Figure 1) and interpolation can 
be used to derive approximate temperature in areas without direct measurement (e.g. Figure 4 and 5), the 
temperatures of railway assets, such as track, overhead lines, or communication units can vary significantly 
over even small distances.  The variations in temperature will depend upon the specific location, the type of 
asset, and will probably be different from the temperature recorded at the nearest weather station. For 
example, Chapman et al. (2006) measured a temperature range of 39°C along a short section of track, and 
overhead lines have been measured  at 10°C warmer than the nearest meteorological station (RSSB, 
2015b). Moreover, the location of the fault provided by Network Rail may not be exact, and may represent 
the mid-point of a track section, along which the fault occurred, rather than the exact location of the asset. 
Accordingly, there is little merit linking asset incidents with temperature measurements (e.g. to develop 
temperature thresholds for specific assets), and it is not appropriate to make comparisons on infrastructure 
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resilience between different regions or Network Rail Routes. For example, lightning was recorded in other 
regions of northern England and Scotland on 1st July 2015, but the railway impacts were mainly observed in 
northeast England. This does not indicate that infrastructure in northeast England is less resilient to 
lightning; lightning strikes in other regions may not have taken place near railway assets. By their design, 
Network Rail fault databases do not included weather impacts that do not cause a fault. This information 
would be necessary to compare infrastructure resilience across region.  There is a need to develop better 
monitoring solutions on the railway to link asset faults with local weather conditions in order to facilitate 
these types of weather impact studies. 
 
5 Discussion & Conclusions  
The extreme weather on 30/1-01/07 impacted upon railway assets the length and breadth of the network. 
Impacts included; damage to infrastructure, passenger delays, passenger discomfort, and financial costs 
incurred to Network Rail and the train operating companies, and the national economy as a consequence of 
passenger and freight delays. Heat or lightning directly impacted infrastructure assets across in England, 
Wales and Scotland (Figure 3) and knock on delays affected rail travel in regions where extreme weather 
did not have a direct impact (Figure 9). Almost all asset types were affected (Figure 6, Table 2), although 
certain asset sub-classes (e.g. Traction Power, Lineside Equipment Track Circuit, Operational Property) may 
be disproportionality affected by extreme heat and lighting. The magnitude of the impact of any particular 
event depends upon the time it takes for normal service to resume, and the criticality (i.e. importance) of 
the track section within the wider railway network. Delays that occurred following incidents on critical 
routes (e.g. London North Eastern that connects London and Scotland; Figure 9a) or near critical transport 
nodes such as Manchester Piccadilly (Figure 9b) can quickly propagate across the railway network.  
The 1st July 2015 was the hottest July day on record, but extreme temperatures and heatwaves are 
projected to become more common and last longer in the future (e.g. Fischer and Schar, 2010; Christidis et 
al., 2015). By the 2040s the heatwave season is expected to expand from July-August to May-September, 
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and by the 2080s, over half the UK will experience heatwave conditions at some point every year 
(Sanderson and Ford, 2016). This has major implications for the long-term infrastructure planning 
undertaken by Network Rail, and for the long-term resilience of the whole of the UK transport network. As 
this study shows, heatwaves, even those of short duration can have a systemic impact on the railway 
infrastructure. It follows that without adaptation, in a future climate with more frequent and longer 
duration heatwaves, the disruption and costs such as those experienced on 30/06-01/07 are likely to occur 
more often. Future assets must be designed to operate in a future warmer climate that experiences more 
high temperature extremes. In particular, care must be taken to consider infrastructure located in urban 
areas. Towns and cities are often warmer than the surrounding countryside due to the urban heat island 
effect (Oke, 1073) and assets are therefore more likely to be exposed to consistently higher temperatures. 
Also, urban areas represent vast concentrations of assets and people that can be affected by extreme heat 
(Chapman et al., 2013), and are often critical transport nodes meaning that any incidents and consequential 
delays will quickly propagate across the railway network and therefore have a disproportionately large 
impact. Moreover, impacts originating from incidents on the railway network can also affect other 
transport systems, which may also be impacted by the same weather issues.  
Network Rail have recently produced a series of regional Weather Resilience and Climate Change 
Adaptation Plans (Network Rail, 2015f); these are summarised in Table 5. The planned actions and potential 
actions vary across the Routes. Anglia, located in the relatively warmer, drier and sunnier southeast of 
England (Mayes, 2013) plans a range of measures to reduce the impact of heat. Wessex, Kent, and Sussex 
Routes, despite their similar geographic location have far fewer planned or potential actions. On 30/06-
01/07 the extreme heat impacted a range of assets in the London North Eastern Route (signalling, track, 
telecoms, building; Figure 7). This Route plans to improve air conditioning and undertake research into new 
methods of keeping equipment cool. Given the widespread impact of heat on the 30/06-01/07 described in 
this study, the planned and potential actions in Table 5 must be implemented across all regions and asset 
types if all heat-related impacts are to be avoided. Fundamentally, Network Rail asset policy specifies that 
all rail electrical equipment should operate across an ambient temperature range of -25ºC to 40ºC; the 
policy also states the need for air-conditioning in equipment housing.  Consequently, legacy equipment that 
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is vulnerable to heat is now being replaced with modern heat-resilient alternatives, and reliable air 
conditioning is made available, as part of normal asset renewal cycles. This will improve resilience to heat.  
In addition, the advent of digital signalling systems (such as the European Rail Train Management System – 
ERTMS) will remove a significant quantity of track-side signalling equipment.   
This study has used FMS and TRUST to understand the impact of extreme weather, but these databases are 
not comprehensive, data entry is not consistent, and most importantly the databases were not designed for 
meteorological analysis and therefore do not collect the appropriate data. Moving forward, a better 
evidence base that clearly demonstrates the impact that extreme weather has on the railway infrastructure 
is required. It may be possible to collect more robust data which is appropriate for meteorological impact 
studies by modifying the recording procedures for the existing databases such as FMS to incorporate 
weather or climate key words in the free text columns. Data is particularly deficient on the impact that 
extreme heat may have on railway users and staff. Emerging techniques such as crowdsourcing, i.e. 
obtaining data or information by enlisting the services of a (potentially large) number of people, usually 
over the Internet,  could be used to collect information on temperature from locations inside (e.g. on 
trains) and outside (e.g. at stations) on the railway network (for a review see Muller et al., 2015). For 
example, Overeem (2013) showed how temperature data could be readily derived from smartphones. 
Network Rail and the train operating companies regularly use social media to communicate with rail 
passengers and crowdsourcing could be used to collect much needed data on the impact that all types of 
extreme weather is having on railway users. A better evidence base will support and guide long-term 
planning decisions for infrastructure and ultimately make the railway network more resilient for the future.  
Network Rail may also find it useful to review their current procedures for managing heat-risk. Over 60 % of 
the delay costs and almost 60% of the delay minutes on 30/06-01/07 were attributed to ESRs that were 
introduced to reduce the chance of buckling. If the ESRs could be removed without jeopardising passenger 
safety, then there would be a significant improvement in service and a reduction in costs for Network Rail, 
especially under future, warmer climatic conditions where under current operational practice more ESRs 
would be required (for ESRs are introduced a specific temperature thresholds (Network Rail, 2015c), which 
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will occur more often in a future warmer climate). Indeed, the Weather Resilience and Climate Change 
Adaptation Plan for Scotland notes that ESRs are often introduced too early simply because the condition of 
the track is unknown (Network Rail, 2015f; Table 4). Improved condition monitoring, perhaps using the 
Internet of Things (IoT) could offer a new approach (e.g. Chapman et al., 2016). Low-cost sensors that 
connect wirelessly to the Internet could be deployed at high-resolution to monitor the real-time 
temperature of tracks known to be susceptible to buckling. This could act as an early warning of the high 
rail temperatures associated with a higher buckling-risk and could be used as an alternative to blanket ESRs, 
particularly towards the end of the summer season or a heatwave event where repeated failure-harvesting 
had improved the infrastructure’s resilience to heat (Ferranti et al., 2016).   
Green infrastructure, such as strategically planted trees or green roofs or walls, could also offer an 
innovative solution for heat-management on the railway network. Chapman et al. (2006) showed that 
much of the spatial variation in daytime rail temperature can be explained simply by shading effects. Trees 
or other green infrastructure could therefore be effectively used to shade track sections at risk of buckling, 
or to shade heat-sensitive equipment such as lineside location cases. Embankment planting can also 
improve stability, drainage and ecology, and strategic planting and appropriate management would limit 
the impact of leaf fall during autumn (LDA, 2012).  
For the future, the rail network faces the challenge of modernising an ageing infrastructure which has 
suffered from historical underinvestment (DfT, 2014), against the backdrop of increasing passenger and 
freight numbers on a network already operating near maximum capacity (Network Rail, 2013). At the same 
time the number of extreme weather events associated with climatic change are increasing (Fisher and 
Schar, 2015). This case study demonstrates how heat can severely affect railway infrastructure and disrupt 
services. It is imperative that Network Rail does not underestimate the potential impact of extreme heat 
following the recent series of mild summers and the unintentional under-recording of heat-related 
incidents and impacts within its different databases. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Temperature measurements on the 30th June and 1st July 2016. Those sites which maintain records longer than 50 years 
in duration and had their July maximum temperature record broken on 1st July are highlighted.  
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Figure 2: Network Rail operating regions in Great Britain and major towns and cities, or those referred to in text. The different 
Routes have been coloured different shades of grey for clarity.  
 
 
   
Figure 3: The number of incidents recorded in the TRUST (top) and FMS (bottom) databases between 15th June and 19th July 
2016. 
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Figure 4: Weather-related incidents from FMS and TRUST on 30th June (left) and 1st July (right). The incidents overlay a 
temperature surface produced using kriging to interpolate between the temperature observations shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 5: Emergency Speed Restrictions from FMS and TRUST on 30th June (left) and 1st July (right). The incidents overlay a 
temperature surface produced using kriging to interpolate between the temperature observations shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 6: Breakdown of incidents by asset type; (a) 30th June; (b) 1st July; (c) 15th June to 19th July, 2016. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The total number of lightning (top) and heat (bottom) incidents on 30/06-01/07 for different asset classes and by Route 
(for those Routes with complete data in FMS database). 
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Figure 8: The total delay minutes for each Route on 30th June (left) and 1st July (right) overlain by delay minutes for incidents 
specifically attributed to heat or lighting, or ESRs. Incidents referred to in  the text on the 30th June include: a) ESRs between 
London Paddington to Ladbroke Grove (2,200 min); b) ESRs on the Brighton mainline between London and Brighton (2,000 min); 
ESRs at Reading (3,200 min); d) ESRS between Salford Crescent and Bolton (1,500 min); and, e) heat-related track fault between 
Stowmarket and Ipswich. On the 1st July, incidents noted in the text include: a) ESRs at Reading (1,500 min); ESRs on the London-
Brighton mainline (4,000 min); lightning incidents at Northallerton (1,200 min, see also Figure 9a); and, d) lightning between 
Alnmouth and Morpeth (1, 800 min). 
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Figure 9: The delays experienced by individual trains along particular sections of track that were attributed to specific inicdents 
including: a) a lightning strike at Northallerton (total ~1,200 minutes); and a b) a pantograph problem close to Manchester 
Piccadilly (total ~19,000 minutes).  Tables 
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Table 1: Those stations with more than 50 years of observations, for which 1 July 2015 was a record (Modified from Kendon et 
al., 2016). See also Figure 1. 
  Site Maximum temperature 
on 1st July 2015 (°C) 
Previous max 
temperature in July (°C) 
Date of previous 
maximum temperature 
Length of 
meteorological record 
(years) 
Durham 31 30.6 31/7/1943, 10/7/1921 133 
Sheffield 33.3 31.7 31/7/1943, 10/7/1921 130 
Bradford 30.9 30.6 31/7/1943, 13/7/1935 106 
Cranwell 34.3 32.6 22/07/1996 93 
Sutton Bonnington 33.6 32.9 19/07/2006 84 
Stonyhurst 32.6 31.1 03/07/1976 75 
Manston 33.6 31.4 15/07/1983 74 
Goudhurst 33.3 32.8 03/07/1976 74 
Waddington 33.1 32.2 12/07/1949 67 
Heathrow 36.7 35.5 19/07/2006 66 
Nottingham (Watnall) 33.9 32.3 03/07/1976 64 
Marham 33.5 32.8 3/7/1976, 5/7/1959 58 
Wittering 35.3 32.8 05/07/1959 53 
St James’s Park 34.7 34.4 05/07/1959 52 
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Table 2: The average number of incidents for different asset classes was calculated for the 5-week comparison period (15th June 
– 19th July) and is shown the Incident/Day column. The number of incidents for different asset classes on 30th June and 1st July is 
also shown, as is the magnitude increase from the average Incident/Day on these dates. The asset types are organised into four 
tables (a-d) by the magnitude increase of the number of incidents over the 30/6-01/07 period. 
a) Asset types with more than twice the average number of incidents per day on 30th June and 1st July 
Asset Name Asset Sub Class Incident/Day 30-Jun 01-Jul Magnitude Increase 30 Jun 
Magnitude 
Increase 1 Jul 
Building Operational Property 6.9 15 20 2.2 2.9 
Electrification & Plant Traction Power 5.9 19 16 3.2 2.7 
Signalling / 
Electrification & Plant 
/ Telecoms 
Lineside Equipment 4.4 11 9 2.5 2.0 
Signalling Staff Protection 0.4 1 1 2.8 2.8 
Signalling Track Circuit 21.4 65 54 3.0 2.5 
Telecoms Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system 0.3 1 1 3.0 3.0 
 
b) Asset types with more than the average number of incidents per day on both 30th June and 1st July 
Asset Name Asset Sub Class Incident/Day 30-Jun 01-Jul Magnitude Increase 30 Jun 
Magnitude 
Increase I Jul 
Building Structures 4.9 9 8 1.8 1.6 
Electrification & Plant Overhead Line 15.9 24 26 1.5 1.6 
Electrification & Plant Signalling Power Supply 8.0 12 16 1.5 2.0 
Signalling Automatic Warning System 3.7 6 4 1.6 1.1 
Signalling Axle Counter 4.2 6 7 1.4 1.7 
Signalling Interlocking 22.8 41 44 1.8 1.9 
Signalling Level Crossing 24.7 54 40 2.2 1.6 
Signalling Signal 42.7 53 77 1.2 1.8 
Telecoms Concentrator 2.7 3 5 1.1 1.9 
Telecoms Power 0.8 1 2 1.2 2.4 
Telecoms Radio 8.4 15 15 1.8 1.8 
Telecoms Telephone 18.0 31 32 1.7 1.8 
Telecoms Transmission Eqpt 9.6 17 17 1.8 1.8 
Telecoms Voice Recorder 0.8 1 4 1.3 5.1 
Track Track 64.6 135 102 2.1 1.6 
UNKNOWN UNKNOWN 66.8 147 99 2.2 1.5 
 
c) Asset types with more than the average number of incidents per day on either both 30th June or 1st July 
Asset Name Asset Sub Class Incident/Day 30-Jun 01-Jul Magnitude Increase 30 Jun 
Magnitude 
Increase 1 Jul 
Electrification & Plant 3rd Rail 4.8 10 4 2.1 0.8 
Signalling Hot Axle Box Detector 1.2 1 4 0.8 3.4 
Signalling Monitor 7.4 10 5 1.4 0.7 
Signalling Point Operating Equipment 0.5 0 1 0.0 2.2 
Signalling Remote Control System 2.0 2 5 1.0 2.5 
Signalling 
Train Protection and Warning 
System 9.6 10 13 1.0 1.3 
Track Unknown 18.5 15 30 0.8 1.6 
 
d) Asset types with less than the average number of incidents per day on both 30th June and 1st July 
Asset Name Asset Sub Class Incident/Day 30-Jun 01-Jul Magnitude Increase 30 Jun 
Magnitude 
Increase 1 Jul 
Signalling Automatic Train Protection 0.3 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Signalling Signalling Control 0.5 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Signalling Unknown 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Telecoms Miscellaneous 0.2 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Telecoms Public Emergency Telephone System 0.2 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Telecoms Stations Information and Security Systems 2.6 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Track Unknown 18.5 15 30 0.8 1.6 
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Table 3: Total delay minutes for all incidents from TRUST on 30th June and 1st July 2015 and the magnitude increase as compared 
to the mean minutes per day for the period 15th June – 19th July (excluding the heatwave event on 30/06-01/07). 
Route Name Mean Minutes/day 
Delay Minutes 
30/06 
Delay Minutes 
01/07 
Magnitude 
Increase 30/06 
Magnitude 
Increase 01/07 
Anglia 3,991 7,792 12,799 2.0 3.2 
London North Eastern & East Midlands 7,788 16,241 20,890 2.1 2.7 
London North Western 9,181 23,833 36,477 2.6 4.0 
Scotland 2,414 2,630 3,948 1.1 1.6 
South East 7,079 20,423 23,340 2.9 3.3 
Wales 2,503 5,600 4,195 2.2 1.7 
Wessex 2,742 4,040 6,871 1.5 2.5 
Western 4,325 16,233 12,011 3.8 2.8 
 
Table 4: Delay minutes and costs for those incidents attributed to weather or ESRs on 30th June and 1st July 2015 
a) Delay minutes 
 ESR Heat Lightning Total 
30th Jun 14,644 11,472 0 26,116 
1st July 9,042 1,269 4,093 14,404 
 
b) Delay costs 
 ESR Heat Lightning Total 
30th Jun £878,320 £527,057 £0 £1,405,376 
1st July £867,205 £83,508 £395,049 £1,345,762 
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Table 5: A summary of the planned actions and potential future actions by Network Rail to order to increase the resilience of the 
railway network to extreme heat and lightning (Network Rail, 2015f). The actions are shown for each Route where; ANG = 
Anglia; LNE = London North Eastern and East Midlands; LNW = London North Western; SCOT = Scotland; SE = South East – Kent, 
Sussex; WES = Wessex; WST = Western (Thames Valley and West). Planned actions are shown in bold (e.g. ANG), potential 
actions in plain (e.g. ANG). Note that Wales does not have any planned actions or potential future actions with respect to heat.  
 
 
 
Weather Asset Issue Action Route 
Heat 
 
All heat-related impacts 
Ensure assessments of temperature resilience measures against 
climate change projections are specified in Route Requirements 
Documents 
LNW 
Track buckling 
 
Review current adverse weather plans  ANG 
Review of remote rail temperature monitoring / CRT  (Critical Rail 
Temperature) database ANG 
Continue white painting of rails. ANG 
Early intervention by track maintenance LNW, SE 
Additional monitoring stations to record more accurate 
temperatures 
SCOT, ANG, 
WST,  
Upgrade track and consider increasing stress-free temperatures LNE 
Research required into enhanced remote monitoring of track 
resistance LNE 
Identify sites where cess support, shoulder ballast restoration, 
replacement of lightweight sleepers or plate support systems 
would be beneficial for CRT management 
ANG 
Model the impact of temperature change on track performance SCOT 
Thermal expansion at swing 
bridges  
Review alternative measures to improve the heat resilience of 
swing bridges ANG 
Clay bank desiccation Use of ‘Earthwork Watch’ system for early warnings and appropriate mitigation SE 
OLE (Overhead Line 
Equipment) sag Remove fixed tension OLE systems ANG 
Equipment/ buildings 
overheating 
Improve air-conditioning ANG, SE, LNE, SCOT 
Research required into new methods of keeping equipment cool LNE 
Shorter working season Assess current heat prep work banks to quantify risk to delivery with shorter working season WES 
Lightning Loss of electrical systems 
Ensure assessments of lightning resilience measures against 
climate change projections  are specified in Route Requirements 
Documents 
LNW 
Review current weather procedures ANG 
Review benefits of lightning array protection of sensitive locations ANG, WES, SE 
Utilise lightning alert and monitoring systems to assist  with 
identification of failed assets and reduce impact on performance LNW 
New or improved lightning protection systems in historically 
vulnerable areas, e.g. Birmingham New Street, Blea Moor 
(Cumbria), Cornwall, Woking to Waterloo 
SE, ANG, LNW, 
WST, SCOT, LNE 
Research required into new lightning protection methods LNE 
